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THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
OF 1977: A UNILATERAL SOLUTION TO
AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM
E. C. Lashbrooke, Jr. t
The enormous amount of attention and publicity generated by recent
disclosures of the foreign corrupt practices of American-based multi-
national enterprises' has exposed the need for some method of curtailing
illegal and questionable payments made abroad. The problem of foreign
corrupt practices is international in scope and the geographical diversity
and internal complexity of the multinational corporation complicates the
search for a solution.
A typical transaction might involve the following sequence: Corporate
officers in the United States decide to pay a "sales commission" to a local
agent overseas. The company could advance the money to the agent either
from its U.S. offices or through one of its subsidiaries or divisions abroad.
The agent in turn funnels the money to a foreign official or political party in
exchange for assistance in some business matter.2 This type of transaction
t Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.A. 1967, M.A. 1968, J.D. 1970,
L.L.M. 1977, University of Texas at Austin.
1. The lion's share of publicity went to Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Lockheed's his-
tory of alleged payoffs goes back to attempts in 1954 to influence the Dutch government to
purchase Lockheed F-104 Starfighters. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23, 1976, at 27. It was also estimated
that Lockheed paid Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands over $1 million in 1961 and 1962 for
his help in influencing his government's decisions. Id at 29. The company reportedly has also
made payoffs in Germany, Italy, Turkey, Colombia, Nigeria, Spain, Greece, and South Africa.
Id at 26. Lockheed's biggest payments were made in Japan where former Prime Minister
Tanaka allegedly received $2 million of the $12.6 million Lockheed reportedly paid to influ-
ence Japanese officials. NEWSWEEK, Aug. 9, 1976, at 32, 35.
Lockheed was not the only American-based corporation involved in foreign corrupt prac-
tices. By 1976, 95 U.S. companies had disclosed to the SEC their participation in questionable
or illegal payments to foreign officials. SEC, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL COR-
PORATE PAYMENTS AND PRAcTIcEs, exhibits A & B (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as
SEC REPORT]. By 1977, the number had exceeded 300. S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
3, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4098, 4100.
2. Two members of the SEC's Division of Enforcement stated:
It is possible to distill four basic reasons for which overseas corporate payments
have been made: (1) to procure or maintain business and corporate activities; (2) to
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may also involve "slush funds," secret bank accounts, false or misleading
corporate financial statements, and exorbitant "consultant" fees for the
agent.3
Most countries have laws regulating corrupt practices such as bribery,
4
but these laws usually apply only to persons within that country. As a re-
suit, the nation in which a corrupt transaction occurs may not be able to
prosecute some of the principals to the transaction-the enterprise, its of-
ficers and domestic employees-due to a lack of jurisdiction. Although
U.S. Government officials have unanimously condemned foreign corrupt
practices by American enterprises, initially they were unable to agree
whether the best solution to the problem was an international agreement,
criminalization, or the implementation of disclosure requirements.5 Con-
gress finally settled on unilateral criminalization as the most feasible answer
and passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA or the Act).6
This Article will first consider pre-FCPA law dealing with foreign cor-
rupt practices. Then the Article will examine the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1977, its likely effect on U.S. foreign relations and American busi-
ness, the potential effectiveness of the Act, and the constitutional implica-
tions of FCPA enforcement. Finally, recommendations will be made as to
a different, and more effective, solution to the problem of foreign corrupt
practices.
evade the payment of foreign taxes; (3) to prevent potential government interference
with corporate operations; and (4) to affect or expedite ministerial matters at the lower
levels of foreign governments. These reasons are by no means exclusive; they can, and
often do, overlap.
Herlihy & Levine, Corporate Crisis: The Overseas Payment Problem, 8 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 547, 550 (1976).
3. Id at 553-58.
4. Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on For-
eign and Corporate Bribes] (testimony of John J. McCloy); id at 65 (testimony of Elliot Rich-
ardson, Secretary of Commerce). For a list of the penalties various countries impose for
bribery, see Note, Prohibiting Foreign Bribes: Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Payments
Abroad, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 231, 235 n.26 (1977).
5. William E. Simon, former Secretary of the Treasury, felt that the development of an
international code of conduct for multinational enterprises was the best way to approach the
problem. Oversight on the Lockheed Loan Guarantee: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1976). Congressman Broyhill
favored disclosure of illegal or questionable foreign payments. 123 CONo. REc. H 11,932
(daily ed. Nov. 1, 1977). Senators Proxmire and Williams supported the criminalization ap-
proach. Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure. Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3
(1977).
6. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd,
78ff). See generally Note, Accountingfor Corporate Misconduct Abroad: The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 293.
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I
PRE-FCPA LAW
Prior to the enactment of the FCPA, no federal law specifically prohib-
ited an enterprise from bribing foreign officials or from contributing to for-
eign political parties or candidates. Although some U.S. legislation does
deal with improper or questionable payments abroad in certain transac-
tions, these pre-FCPA laws--due to their limited, fragmented nature-fail
to deter bribery of foreign officials by American corporations.7
One such pre-FCPA law is the International Security Assistance and
Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Arms Export Act).8 This Act regulates
sales of military material abroad and the size of agent's fees paid in connec-
tion with such sales.9 It provides that the President shall submit a report to
Congress recommending whether the United States should continue a se-
curity assistance program when information exists that an American corpo-
ration has made illegal or improper payments to foreign officials in return
for a military goods contract.' 0 In addition, the President has the power to
limit, prohibit, or prescribe conditions with respect to such sales. The Arms
Export Act also authorizes the Secretary of State to promulgate rules and
regulations requiring the reporting of political contributions that any per-
7. At the start of the Senate hearings on the subject, some cabinet members believed that
pre-FCPA laws were adequate in deterring foreign bribes. Secretary of the Treasury William
E. Simon thought that the activities of the IRS, SEC, and Departments of State and Defense
represented a significant response to the problem of foreign corrupt practices. Senate Hearings
on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 4, at 91-93. Secretary of Commerce Elliot Rich-
ardson felt that new legislation on foreign corrupt practices was not needed at the time. Id at
84.
As the various hearings proceeded, the attitude of government officials changed. Secretary
of Commerce Richardson came to believe that even the most vigorous enforcement of existing
laws would be inadequate. Letter from Elliot Richardson, Chairman of the President's Task
Force on Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad, to Sen. William Proxmire, June 11, 1976,
at 13 [hereinafter cited as Task Force Letter], reprinted in Prohibiting Bribes to Foreign OAficiais:
Hearing Before the Senate Comn on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
39-67 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing on Prohibiting Bribes]. Chairman Richard-
son also reported that President Ford felt that current law was not sufficient to deal with for-
eign corrupt practices. Task Force Letter, supra, at 23.
8. Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (1976) (to be codified in scattered sections of 22
U.S.C.).
9. Id § 604(b), 22 U.S.C.A. § 2779 (West Supp. 1979).
10. Id § 607, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2394a (West Supp. 1979). Obviously, the intent of this section
is to pressure foreign governments to comply with U.S. attitudes toward corrupt foreign prac-
tices. The foreign government, however, may be willing to forego the security assistance pro-
gram rather than yield to pressure by the United States. Since foreign military sales play a
large role in the American balance of payments system, it is unlikely that the United States
will aggressively enforce the Arms Export Act.
1979]
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son pays, offers, or agrees to pay to promote a sale of defense articles or
services to foreign armed forces."
Despite these provisions, the Arms Export Act has little effect on for-
eign corrupt practices. Armament sales abroad account for a significant
percentage of U.S. exports and the sales have both economic and political
overtones. Arms sales not only help the balance of payments but also serve
to implement U.S. foreign policy. Therefore, foreign policy and economic
considerations frequently outweigh the antibribery policy expressed by the
Arms Export Act.
The Export-Import Bank of the United States has regulations requir-
ing an American firm involved in a contract that includes the payment of
commissions to file a report detailing the commissions. 12 Any person who
knowingly and willingly falsifies this report is subject to a fine of up to
$10,000 and imprisonment for up to five years.13 But the limited scope of
the requirements prevents the Bank from significantly deterring foreign
bribery. The requirements apply only to sales financed with loans from the
Export-Import Bank. Moreover, the Bank's regulations do not prohibit the
payment of commissions; they merely require that the contracting parties
report the payments.
Similarly, the limited applicability of the criminal and civil sanctions
imposed on U.S. corporations that deduct improper or questionable pay-
ments as a business expense on their corporate income tax returns prevents
these sanctions from acting as effective restraints on foreign bribes. 14 Al-
though the Internal Revenue Service actively seeks out "slush funds" and
investigates corporations for improper and questionable foreign piy-
ments,' 5 the IRS limits its confidential investigations to tax-related
problems. Furthermore, federal tax laws do not prohibit improper or ques-
tionable payments but merely disallow them as business expense deduc-
tions.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has used the disclosure re-
quirements of the Securities Act of 193316 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 193417 to regulate foreign corrupt practices.' 8 These acts contain no ex-
11. Id § 604(b), 22 U.S.C.A. § 2779(b) (West Supp. 1979).
12. Task Force Letter, supra note 7, at 11.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
14. I.R.C. § 162(c) provides that taxpayers may not deduct bribes and kickbacks in com-
puting taxable income if the payment would be unlawful in the United States under U.S. law.
15. Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 4, at 92 (statement of
William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury). The Securities and Exchange Commission re-
fers information it receives that has tax consequences to the Internal Revenue Service. Id
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
17. Id. §§ 78a-78kk.
18. See, e.g., SEC v. United Brands Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 95,420 (D.D.C. 1976) (consent order).
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press provisions concerning the disclosure of improper or questionable pay-
ments, but the pre-FCPA position of the SEC was that the existing
securities laws required disclosure of such payments.' 9
Although SEC enforcement of pre-FCPA securities laws may have
been effective in controlling some foreign corrupt practices, SEC jurisdic-
tion prior to the enactment of the FCPA extended to less than one-third of
all U.S. enterprises doing business abroad.20 Furthermore, the pre-FCPA
securities laws require disclosure only of material facts so that the investor
may make an informed decision on the value of any security. 21 Under this
standard the issue of materiality amounts to a determination of the market
impact of the information. Questionable or improper payments made
abroad are therefore not material facts unless they affect the value of the
security.22
II
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977
A. PURPOSES
The FCPA prohibits* payments or gifts to foreign officials or foreign
political parties or candidates for the purpose of influencing an official act
or decision of a foreign government on behalf of a U.S. business enterprise.
American officials consider such activity reprehensible because it (1) cor-
rupts the free enterprise system; (2) runs counter to U.S. ethical and moral
19. Task Force Letter, supra note 7, at 15.
20. Over 30,000 U.S. exporters, plus some additional private companies that are not sub-
ject to SEC disclosure requirements, do business abroad. Approximately 9,000 corporations,
not all of which do business abroad, regularly file documents with the SEC. Id
21. "The term 'material', when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of infor-
mation as to any subject, limits the information required to those matters as to which an aver-
age prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before buying or selling the security
registered." 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(j) (1978).
22. To bolster its position with respect to materiality, the SEC has adopted the "steward-
ship" or "management integrity" approach. The SEC bases this theory on the belief that cor-
porate managers are stewards acting on behalf of the shareholders for the honest use of the
corporate funds entrusted to their care. SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 19-20. Under this ap-
proach the falsification of corporate books and records and the establishment of "slush funds"
would be material information. Id at 22. Not everyone shared the SEC's interpretation of
materiality at the Senate hearings on corrupt foreign practices. Elliot Richardson, chairman of
the President's Task Force on Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad, believed that the
legal grounds on which the SEC based its position on materiality were tenuous. Task Force
Letter, supra note 7, at 16. Ray Garrett, former chairman of the SEC, thought that it would be
difficult to justify singling out foreign bribery, but not other illegal corporate acts, as material.
Id
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values; (3) creates foreign policy problems; and (4) undermines public con-
fidence at home and abroad in U.S. business enterprises.23
Congress considered two different approaches in its search for a uni-
lateral solution to the problem of foreign corrupt practices. One approach
would have required full disclosure of bribes or questionable payments. 24
The other suggested approach was to prohibit such payments and impose
- criminal sanctions for offering, giving, or asking for them.25 After extensive
debate, Congress selected the criminalization approach and passed the
FCPA.
In opting for criminalization, Congress seems to have recognized the
inadequacy of disclosure requirements as a remedy for the problem of brib-
ery of foreign officials. Disclosure imposes great administrative costs and
burdens on both the corporations required to disclose and the agency in
charge of the program. 26 Moreover, disclosure has little deterrent effect 27
and may even legitimize bribes.
In contrast, criminalization of foreign corrupt practices is the strongest
possible stance that the Federal Government can take in opposition to these
practices. It leaves no doubt that the Government considers foreign corrupt
practices reprehensible. The criminalization approach also allows business
enterprises to point to the law when confronted with requests for illegal
payments. 28 Finally, criminalization avoids the time and expense of com-
piling and verifying lengthy reports.
23. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, CORRUPT OVERSEAS
PAYMENTS BY U.S. BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE REPORT ON S. 3664]; 123 CONG. REC. HI 1,931 (daily ed.
Nov. 1, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt).
24. S. 3741, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3, 122 CONG. REC. S13,807 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1976),
provided:
A person shall report to the Secretary [of Commerce] ... payments hereafter made on
behalf of the person or the person's foreign affiliate to any other individual or entity in
connection with: An official action, or sale to or contract with a foreign government,
for the commercial benefit of the person or his foreign affliate.
25. S. 3664, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), represented the criminalization approach. The
Senate passed it by unanimous vote, 122 CONG. REC. S 15,862 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1976), but the
House of Representatives adjourned before taking action.
26. For example, Gulf Oil Corporation reportedly spent over $3 million conducting an
investigation for the SEC's voluntary disclosure program. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2d
SESS., SEC VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE PROGRAM ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 23 (Comm.
Print 1976). See also Senate Hearing on Prohibiting Bribes, supra note 7, at 12; Senate Hearings
on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 4, at 88.
27. See Note, supra note 4, at 250.
28. COMMITTEE REPORT ON S. 3664, supra note 23, at 4 (Sen. William Proxmire quoting
testimony of Bob Dorsey, former chairman of the Gulf Oil Corporation).
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B. PROVISIONS
The FCPA applies to all domestic concerns, 29 not just reporting com-
panies.30 The Act thus amends and expands the traditional scope of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Under the FCPA provisions, it is un-
lawful corruptly 31 to offer, give, or authorize a payment or gift to a foreign
official for the purpose of influencing his act or decision in order to obtain
or retain business for an enterprise. 32 Similar payments or gifts to a foreign
political party or its candidates are also unlawful.33 The purpose of the
offer, gift, or payment must be the corruption of a foreign official, foreign
political party, or its candidateY4 The intent must be to obtain or retain
business for the enterprise.35 Significantly, the FCPA prohibits payments
by a corporation to its foreign agents if the corporate officers or directors
know or have reason to know that the agent will offer all or part of the
payment to a foreign official, political party, or candidate for office for the
purposes described above.36
The FCPA contains stiff penalties to enforce its provisions. Reporting
companies and domestic concerns that violate the Act face fines of up to
$1 million.37 Any officer, director, or shareholder convicted under the Act
is subject to a fine of up to $10,000 and imprisonment for up to five years.38
In keeping with the SEC's policy against corporate indemnification of fines
imposed for willful violations of the securities laws, the FCPA does not
29. The FCPA defines a domestic concern as:
. . . any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; or...
any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, un-
incorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of busi-
ness in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United
States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-2(d)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
30. A reporting company is an issuer of securities registered or required to file reports
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. § 78dd-l(a).
31. The drafters of the FCPA intended "corruptly" to be interpreted consistent with 18
U.S.C. § 201(b) (1976), where it connotes an intent or desire to influence wrongfully. COM-
MITTEE REPORT ON S. 3664, supra note 23, at 7.
32. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l(a)(1), -2(a)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
33. Id. §§ 78dd-l(a)(2), -2(a)(2).
34. Id. §§ 78dd-l(a)(1), -2(a)(1).
35. Id The FCPA does not prohibit "grease" or facilitating payments since the intent of
these payments is to induce minor officials to perform ministerial or clerical duties and not to
obtain or retain business for an enterprise. 123 CONG. REc. H 1,932 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1977)
(remarks of Rep. Eckhardt). The FCPA prohibits payments that undermine competition but
not "grease" payments, which contribute to smooth operations. The exemption for "grease"
payments can be justified on economic grounds since investigation and enforcement costs
would preclude prosecution for all such payments.
36. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), -2(a)(3) (West Supp. 1979).
37. Id. §§ 78dd-2(b)(1)(A), ff(c)(1).
38. Id. §§ 78dd-2(b)(1)(B), ff(c)(2).
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allow an enterprise to indemnify convicted officers, directors, or sharehold-
ers.
39
The Act also requires all reporting companies to keep their records in
sufficient detail to reflect accurately transactions involving the enterprise's
assets.4° In addition, the reporting company must devise and maintain a
system of internal accounting procedures that reasonably ensures that man-
agement directs these transactions and authorizes access to assets. 4 1 The
enterprise must properly record the transactions according to generally ac-
cepted accounting principles and make a comparison at reasonable inter-
vals of differences between recorded and existing assets.42 By requiring
accurate records and a system of internal auditing controls, the FCPA at-
tempts to force officers and directors to ensure that their enterprises use
corporate assets only for proper purposes.
III
EFFECTS AND EFFECTIVENESS
A. EFFECTS
Although the United States will generally be able to prosecute only
domestic corporations and corporate officers and directors involved in the
payment of foreign bribes, 43 it will have to investigate the conduct of for-
eign government officials.44 One result of an FCPA investigation will be
the disclosure of the identity of a foreign official suspected of accepting
bribes. The officeholder will then be subject to adverse publicity and possi-
39. The SEC refuses to permit acceleration of registrations under the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976), except on conditions set out in the implementing regula-
tions, 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 (1978), if the issuer promises to indemnify its officers and directors
who violate securities laws. See also Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 387 F.
Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974), vacatedon other ground, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Globus v. Law
Research Service, Inc. 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), af d, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969).
40. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(2)(A) (West Supp. 1979).
41. Id § 78m(2)(B).
42. Id §§ 78m(2)(B)(ii), (iv). The accounting provisions of the FCPA are essentially those
recommended by the SEC in its report of May 22, 1976. SEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 63-64.
43. Three jurisdictional theories allow the United States to prosecute individuals or corpo-
rations for violations of the FCPA that occur in a foreign territory. The active personality
theory of the nationality principle imposes a duty on every national, when abroad, to obey
those of its sovereign laws intended to have extraterritorial effect. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 30 (1965). Under the protective princi-
ple, a nation may protect itself from activity abroad that threatens a special state interest.
Bassiouni, Theories of Jurisdiction and Their Application in Extradition Law and Practice, 5
CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 1, 47 (1974). Finally, the effects doctrine of the extended territorial princi-
ple grants jurisdiction to a country over criminal conduct that has a substantial effect within
that country. COMMITTEE REPORT ON S. 3664, supra note 23, at 16.
44. Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 4, at 95 (statement of
William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury).
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bly pressure from his own government to resign. This result is particularly
unfortunate because he probably will not have an opportunity to prove his
innocence. Obviously, unilateral prosecution by the United States alleging
wrongdoing by foreign officials will cause serious foreign relations
problems45 and will be detrimental to U.S. interests abroad.46
In addition, enforcement of the FCPA could result in two countries
prosecuting the payor of the bribe for the same act.47 If only the United
States elects to prosecute, the result will be the unequal treatment of two
parties both at fault. Most importantly, the FCPA may make it more diffi-
cult for the United States to negotiate a multilateral agreement on trans-
national bribery.48
Furthermore, refusal of U.S. businesses to pay bribes will put these
enterprises at a competitive disadvantage to foreign firms that are willing
and able to make payments. 49 A 1975 survey indicated that almost one-half
of the corporate chief executive officers of major U.S. enterprises thought
that bribery was necessary in order to do business in some foreign coun-
tries.50 Ian Macgregor, chairman of the United States Council of the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce, felt that imposing "totally mandatory
arrangements on U.S. companies. . without having any mechanism for
insuring that the competitors of these American businesses accord to similar
rules" could be counterproductive.5 ' The council itself concluded that uni-
lateral action on foreign bribes by the United States "could and in some
cases would mitigate severely against U.S. business and prevent it from
being able to compete effectively in quite substantial markets of the
world."52
U.S. business enterprises will undoubtedly suffer a loss of business
abroad as a result of the FCPA.53 The extent of this loss cannot yet be
determined. With its current balance of payments problem, however., the
United States should be encouraging foreign trade. Of course, the United
States should not condone bribery for the sake of increased trade. It
45. Id at 101 (statement of Charles W. Robinson, Under Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs).
46. Id at 95 (statement of William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury).
47. Id
48. The Secretary of the Treasury was concerned that unilateral action "might undercut
the vital principle that cooperative action by the whole international community of nations is
needed in order to deal effectively with [the] problem [of foreign bribery]." Id at 94.
49. Id at 101 (statement of Charles W. Robinson, Under Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs).
50. CoMMiTTrE REPORT ON S. 3664, supra note 23, at 4.
51. Senate Hearings on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 4, at 53.
52. Id
53. Reporting companies will also incur the costs involved in complying with the FCPA's
accounting requirements. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
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should, however, seek to establish a system that prohibits the bribery of
foreign officials without harming U.S. business interests.
B. EFFECTIVENESS
By opting for criminalization rather than disclosure in the FCPA, Con-
gress has created acute enforcement problems.54 Essentially, the Govern-
ment in an FCPA prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1)
payment; (2) illegal purpose and intent;55 and (3) if, as will generally be the
case, a foreign agent of the corporation makes the payment, knowledge or a
reason to know of the bribe on the part of the corporate officers or direc-
tors.
56
It is probable that corporate agents bribe foreign officials to ensure that
they receive their commissions on sales. The agent may or may not trans-
mit knowledge of these transactions up the corporation's internal hierarchy.
The law generally does not impute the knowledge of an agent to his princi-
pal when the agent secretly acts adversely to the interests of the principal.57
Nor will the law charge a principal with the knowledge that his agent has
done or intends to do an unauthorized act.5 8 Therefore, when a corpora-
tion makes a payment to its foreign agent, the Government may have diffi-
culty proving that the corporation through its officers or directors intended,
knew, or had reason to know that the agent would use all or part of the
payment to bribe a foreign official, political party, or candidate.
The difficulty of obtaining evidence compounds the problem of estab-
lishing the elements of the crime in an FCPA prosecution. The foreign situs
of the act of bribery will generally be the location of some, if not most, of
the necessary evidence. Three different jurisdictional situations may con-
front U.S. authorities in their efforts to obtain evidence abroad. First, a
54. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Justice Department divide the task
of enforcing the FCPA. The SEC collects and reviews information, conducts investigations,
and brings suits for injunctions while the Justice Department carries out criminal prosecutions.
S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 11-12 (1977). Referring a criminal case to the Justice
Department places an added burden on the SEC staff since after completing its work the staff
must assist a Justice Department attorney in the preparation of the criminal case.
Moreover, SEC jurisdiction does not extend to all domestic concerns but only to reporting
companies. The Justice Department has sole investigative and prosecutorial authority over
domestic concerns under the FCPA. Id Since reporting companies constitute a relatively
small number of all domestic businesses subject to the FCPA, it hardly seems reasonable to
divide authority on this basis. Sole authority should be given to the Justice Department to
avoid conflict. See 123 CONG. REc. H 11,933 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1977) (minority views to H.R.
3815).
55. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
56. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 282 (1957).
58. Id § 280.
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U.S. citizen living abroad may have the evidence. Second, evidence may be
in the possession of a foreign subsidiary or division of a parent corporation
based in the United States. Finally, a foreign national having no link to the
United States may be in control of evidence.
When evidence is in the possession of an American citizen living
abroad, a U.S. court may exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the nationality
principle. 59 The court may issue a subpoena requiring the citizen to appear
or produce documentary evidence under his control if the particular testi-
mony or document is necessary in the interest ofjustice.60 Failure to honor
the subpoena can result in a contempt citation.
61
When a foreign subsidiary or division of a parent corporation based in
the United States has evidence in its possession, American courts can re-
quire that the parent corporation produce all evidence over which the par-
ent has control.62 If any corporate officer or agent of the parent has the
power to require that its foreign subsidiary or division send documents to
the home office, the court will presume that the parent has sufficient control
to produce them when ordered to do so by a subpoena.63 Some countries,
however, impose civil or criminal liability for removal or disclosure of cer-
tain documents found within their borders.64 The Supreme Court has held
that a U.S. court may order a party in a civil litigation to produce records
even if production would violate a foreign statute.6 5 Since the fifth amend-
ment's right against self-incrimination does not apply to corporations,
66
courts will undoubtedly order an enterprise to produce all documents under
its control, regardless of the location of the evidence, in an FCPA prosec-
tion of a corporation. Corporate officers and directors, however, will enjoy
the benefits of the fifth amendment. Furthermore, courts are reluctant to
force any individual or corporation acting as a witness to violate a foreign
law in order to comply with a subpeona duces tecum.67 Therefore, in a trial
for FCPA violations, the prosecution may not be able to obtain documen-
59. See note 43 supra; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) (1976).
61. Id. § 1784.
62. United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1968);
Hopson v. United States, 79 F.2d 302, 303 (2d Cir. 1935).
63. First National City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616, 618 (2d Cir. 1959).
64. See, e.g., Schweizerische Strafgesetzbuch [STGB] art. 273 (Switz.); Application of
Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1962) (translation of Article 89 of Law No.
17 of Panama prohibiting Panamanian merchants from furnishing copies of their documents
for use in an action abroad).
65. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
66. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
67. See Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962); Ings v.
Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
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tary evidence under the control of an individual defendant or a corporation
acting as a witness.
The most difficult situation that may confront the prosecution in an
FCPA case is that in which evidence abroad is in the hands of a foreign
national who has no link with the United States. Since the United States
does not have personal jurisdiction, the court will have to issue a letter
rogatory seeking the cooperation of the foreign sovereign.6 8 As a matter of
comity the foreign state may, if allowable under its legal system, obtain the
requested evidence. 69 American courts, however, have been generally hesi-
tant to comply with requests for assistance from foreign criminal tribu-
nals.70 Thus, it would not be surprising for foreign courts to note a
potential lack of reciprocity and refuse to use their legal powers of coercion
to obtain evidence for American criminal trials under the FCPA.7 t
Unlike documentary evidence illegally seized abroad, 72 oral testimony
of foreign witnesses taken by deposition presents difficult constitutional
questions. The sixth amendment guarantees the accused the right to con-
front adverse witnesses, but it is unlikely that foreign witnesses will be will-
ing to come to the United States to testify in an FCPA prosecution. A court
cannot dispense with the accused's right of confrontation simply because
the witness is not within its jurisdiction;73 rather the prosecution must make
a good faith effort to have the witness testify at trial.74 If this effort fails,
68. A letter rogatory is a request to assist the administration ofjustice issued by a court in
one country to a court in another country, usually through diplomatic channels. See 6 M.
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 (1968).
69. See generally Mueller, International Judicial.4ssistance in Criminal Matters, 7 VILL. L.
REV. 193 (1961-62).
70. Id at 198. According to Professor Mueller, the reasons for American courts' lack of
cooperation include "traditional isolationism, ignorance of foreign criminal law and proce-
dure-which often is suspected of being inquisitorial-or simple unfamiliarity with a court's
own express or implied powers to grant judicial assistance." Id
71. If a foreign country does decide to cooperate with the American judiciary, any method
it uses to obtain the requested evidence will probably be constitutionally permissible. U.S.
courts hold that fourth amendment rights are "personal ... [and] may not be vicariously
asserted." Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). Therefore, a defendant does
not have standing to ask a court to suppress evidence seized from another person in a manner
precluded by the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. Fur-
thermore, the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule of evidence do not apply to acts of
foreign officials. Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968) (evidence seized by
Phillippine officials admissible even though the Phillippine Supreme Court ruled that the
searches and seizures violated a provision of the Phillippine constitution identical to the fourth
amendment). Thus, in order for a court to suppress illegally seized evidence, a defendant will
have to show that the seizure violated his fourth amendment rights and U.S. agents had a
sufficient role in the confiscation. United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1976);
Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1965).
72. See note 71 su.pra.
73. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 723-24 (1968).
74. Id at 723-25. See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 166 (1970).
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another course of action remains open to the prosecution. Since the
Supreme Court has held that the functions of the confrontation clause are
to insure that the testimony offered is reliable75 and to "afford the trier of
fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the . . . statement, '76
other procedures that satisfy these requirements may substitute for actual
confrontation at trial. Thus, when the prosecution finds it impossible to
secure the presence of a foreign witness, the Organized Crime Control Act
of 197077 may permit the use of his dej)osition as substantive evidence. 78
Several circuit courts of appeals have upheld the constitutionality of
the deposition provision of the Organized Crime Control Act in the face of
confrontation clause challenges. 79 These courts have reasoned that the stat-
ute meets the procedural safeguards called for by the confrontation clause
by requiring an authorized person to place the deponent under oath, al-
lowing the defendant to be present and represented by counsel, and permit-
ting a wide scope of examination and rigorous cross-examination. 80
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of
the statute, and it is likely that the use of a deposition as substantive evi-
dence in an FCPA prosecution will produce allegations of deprivation of
sixth amendment rights.81
The effectiveness of the FCPA as a deterrent to American corporate
bribery of foreign officials is contingent on successful prosecution. Many
barriers obstruct any attempt by the Justice Department to have a corpora-
75. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
76. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970).
77. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
78. The act allows the use of depositions at a criminal trial when "the witness is out of the
United States, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party
offering the deposition." Id at § 601(a), 18 U.S.C. § 3503() (1976).
79. See United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976), ceri. denied, 430 U.S. 966
(1977); United States v. Ricketson, 498 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 965
(1974); United States v. Singleton, 460 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984
(1973). But see the strong dissenting opinion in Singleton, 460 F.2d at 1158 (case "goes
further than any other in the history of federal jurisprudence to make the sixth amendment
and its confrontation clause a nullity") (Oakes, J. dissenting).
80. 552 F.2d at 840; 498 F.2d at 374; 460 F.2d at 1153.
81. The use of depositions obtained by foreign witnesses in FCPA prosecutions presents
another problem. The prosecution may only obtain and use a deposition as substantive evi-
dence under 18 U.S.C. §,3503 if the Attorney General or his designee has certified that he
believes the defendant has "participated in an organized criminal activity." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3503(a) (1976). The statute contains no definition of "organized criminal activity"; therefore
the question becomes whether the act of bribing a foreign official satisfies the provision. In
United States v. Singleton, 460 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973), the
court held that the Attorney General had complete discretion as to what constituted an "orga-
nized criminal activity" and his decision was not subject to judicial review. 460 F.2d at 1154.
The dissenting judge felt that the majority had abdicated its judicial function. 460 F.2d at
1157 (Oakes, J. dissenting).
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tion or its officers or directors convicted for FCPA violations. The prosecu-
tion may not be able to obtain necessary documentary evidence located
abroad. The fifth amendment right against self-incrimination may prevent
the use of subpoenaed documentary evidence against individual officers
and directors. Depositions taken abroad may not withstand sixth amend-
ment claims to the right of confrontation. Moreover, any attempted prose-
cution, whether or not successful, will damage American business and
foreign relations. Clearly a different approach to the problem of foreign
bribery is needed.
IV
THE ADVANTAGES OF AN INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT
The FCPA represents a strong unilateral stance taken by the United
States against foreign corrupt practices. But a lack of international cooper-
ation in controlling such practices may reduce the U.S. stance to little more
than a policy statement. Obviously, the United States needs a means of
ensuring the regulation of foreign enterprises as well as the recipients of
bribes (who may in fact be extortionists). The only way to obtain the neces-
sary international cooperation is by means of a multilateral agreement.82
An international agreement would eliminate most of the potentially
adverse effects that the United States will suffer in trying to enforce the
FCPA. First, an international agreement would protect American busi-
nesses since all firms would compete for contracts on an equal basis. Qual-
82. Currently, the only multilateral agreement dealing with foreign corrupt practices in
general is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Declaration
and Guidelines. The OECD Declaration sets forth standards for the activities of multilateral
enterpises in OECD member countries. It provides:
Enterprises should
7. not render--and they should not be solicited or expected to render-any bribe or
other improper benefit, direct or indirect, to any public servant or holder of public
office;
8. unless legally permissible, not make contributions to candidates for public office
or to political parties or other political organizations ...
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL INVEST-
MENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 13 (1976). Unfortunately, the OECD Declaration
and Guidelines are only recommendations and contain no sanctions for violations. S. REP.
No. 1307, 94TH CONG., 2d SEss. 2 (1976).
The United States also entered several treaties in order to aid its investigation of Lockheed
Aircraft Corporation, note 1 supra. See Procedures for Mutual Assitance in the Administra-
tion of Justice in Connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, May 20, 1976,
United States-Greece, 27 U.S.T. 2006, T.I.A.S. No. 8300; Procedures for Mutual Assistance in
the Administration of Justice in Connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter,
April 20, 1976, United States-Nigeria, 27 U.S.T. 1054, T.I.A.S. No. 8243.
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ity, price, and service rather than freedom to bribe would be the
determinative factors in awarding contracts. Since bribery would not be a
cost of doing business, this approach would also benefit purchasing coun-
tries, which would receive goods at lower prices.
Second, a multilateral treaty would avoid the detrimental foreign rela-
tion implications that FCPA prosecutions would generate. The foreign offi-
cial accused of accepting a bribe would have the opportunity to clear
himself in a tribunal of his own country rather than having to face innuen-
dos from abroad and pressure to resign from home. If duly convicted, the
official probably could not take retaliatory measures against American
businesses operating in his homeland. In addition, a treaty would provide
for the punishment of both parties to a bribe, thereby preventing unequal
treatment of those who may be equally at fault.
Finally, an international agreement would avoid the appearance that
the United States is attempting to export its morality to other nations. Al-
though bribery is illegal in almost all countries, 83 sovereign governments
may interpret an FCPA prosecution as an attempt by the United States to
pressure them into bringing charges against their own officials.84 By con-
trast, an international agreement would represent a voluntary commitment
by all signatory nations to prosecute persons who either offer or accept
bribes.
An international agreement would also be the best method of ensuring
foreign judicial assistance whenever evidence or witnesses are in another
country.8 5 Currently, the United States is party to several international
agreements that pledge assistance to another country's attempts to enforce
its criminal laws.86 Although it covers a variety of crimes, the Treaty on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the United States and
Switzerland8 7 serves as a useful source of the types of provisions needed to
effectuate judicial assistance between nations attempting to prosecute those
83. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
84. 7he Aclivities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad." Hearings Before the
House Subcommn on International Economic Policy, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1975) (statement
of Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State). Contra, COMM. REPORT
ON S. 3664, supra note 23, at 4-5 (statement of M.D. Mokama, Attorney General of the African
Republic of Botswana) (Third World nations would appreciate U.S. legislation aimed at cur-
tailing the corrupt practices of American transnational enterprises).
85. "In order to establish the smoothest exchange of the maximum amount of judicial
assistance in criminal matters, a treaty, unquestionably, is ultimately called for." G. MUELLER
& E. WISE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 416 (1965).
86. See, e.g., Procedures for Mutual Assistance, March 29, 1976, United States-
Netherlands, 27 U.S.T. 1064, T.I.A.S. No. 8245; Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (entered
into force Jan. 23, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Treaty on Criminal Matters].
87. Treaty on Criminal Matters, supra note 86.
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who offer, give, solicit, or receive bribes in international business
transactions.
An international agreement modeled after the U.S.-Switzerland treaty
but dealing solely with foreign corrupt practices would obligate each con-
tracting nation to assist in locating persons, taking testimony or statements,
effecting the production of evidence, and serving and authenticating docu-
ments.88 Upon receiving a request for judicial assistance, the contracting
nation would be bound to compel a person to testify and produce docu-
ments in the same manner and extent as in the requested state's purely do-
mestic investigations and proceedings. 89 By agreeing that the treaty
provisions take precedence over municipal legislation, the parties could pre-
vent the law of the requested nation from frustrating bribery investigations
and prosecutions.90
Although a treaty would make obtaining evidence of foreign corrupt
practices easier, the agreement could protect the accused's fundamental
rights to a greater extent than they are currently safeguarded in inter-
national investigations. First, the treaty could provide that a court may not
compel a person to testify or produce evidence if he has a right to refuse to
do so under the law of either the requesting or requested nation.9 1 Second,
the agreement could prohibit all searches and seizures that would violate
the law of the requesting state.92 Finally, the treaty could allow the pres-
ence of the accused, his counsel, and representatives of the requesting state
at any evidentiary proceeding initiated under the agreement if the parties'
presence was necessary to make the evidence admissible. 93
The United States should not jeopardize its chances of negotiating a
multilateral agreement on foreign corrupt practices by actively enforcing
the FCPA and thereby alienating other governments. 94 Nor should the
United States allow other governments to become complacent by unilater-
ally policing multinational enterprises. Administrative hearings and civil
proceedings are adequate to enforce the accounting requirements of the
FCPA. The United States should not enforce the criminal provisions of the
FCPA in any situation that could cause a strain on U.S. foreign relations or
harm American business.
88. See id art. 1, para. 4.
89. See id art. 10, para. 1.
90. Compare Treaty on Criminal Matters, supra note 86, at art. 38, para. 3 with note 64
supra and accompanying text.
91. See Treaty on Criminal Matters, supra note 86, at art. 10, para 1.
92. Compare id art. 9, para. 2, with note 71 supra.
93. Compare Treaty on Criminal Matters, supra note 86, at art. 12 with notes 73-81 supra
and accompanying text.
94. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The FCPA is a unilateral approach to the international problem of
foreign corrupt practices. Foreign states may be indifferent to the corrup-
tion problem and antagonistic to U.S. intrusion into their domestic affairs.
Therefore, attempts to enforce the FCPA will have detrimental effects on
U.S. foreign relations and businesses. There will also be difficulties with
acquiring evidence and protecting constitutional rights in criminal prosecu-
tions under the FCPA. A multinational agreement on transnational corrupt
practices is the most satisfactory way to eliminate these problems.

CORNELL
INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL
Volume 12 Summer 1979 Number 2
OFFICERS
DAVID A. CHURCHILL
Editor-in-Chief
ANDREW H. SHAW
JAMES F. BAUERLE
KATHLEEN A. BURSLEY
Managing Editors
DAVID R. CLARKE
Article & Book Review Editor
BARBARA . HECK
BUsiness Editor
KATHLEEN S. ALLEN
STEWART F. ALY
ROBERT K. ANDERBERG
KARIN BIERSTEIN
DANIEL C. BRENNAN
PETER J. CALIN
RICHARD M. COGEN
KEVIN J. CULLIGAN
GEORGE H. DIPPEL
STEPHEN DUNEGAN
DAVID A. FRANKEL
PETER I. FRIEDENBERG
MATTHEW A. GABEL
WALTER T. GANGL
THOMAS GEORGE GENTITHES
JONATHAN H. GEORGE
KEVIN M. GILLIS
SUSAN D. GOLAND
STEVEN E. GRILL
BRUCE D. GRIVETTI
ELIEZER HASSINE
FREDERICK T. HAWKES
ROBERT HYKAN
DONALD A. JOSEPHSON
DAVID LEE KOVACS
BOARD OF EDITORS
ALEXANDER C. BLACK
PAMELA ANNE CUMMINGS
J. ALLEN MILLER
Note & Comment Editors
CYNTHIA L. AUGUSTYN
GARY M. ROWEN
Research Editors
EDWARD J. LINDNER
THEODORE LINDSAY
DORIS E. LONG
SANDRA E. LORIMER
WILLIAM J. LYNN III
KEVIN MACKENZIE
MARY BRIGID MCMANAMON
JENNIFER L. MILLER
STEPHANIE J. MITCHELL
VICKI ORANSKY
JOHN C. PEIRCE
ALICIA PLOTKIN
STUART J. RAPPAPORT
RICHARD A. SAMUELS
ALAN D. SCHEER
DAVID REUEL SCHMAHMANN
WILLIAM W. SCHROEDER
STEPHEN R. SEELY
ROBERT F. SHARPE, JR.
MICHAEL J. SMITH
ROBERT G. SOUAID
JANET G. SPECK
CHARLES B. STOCKDALE
CAROLYN J.A. SWIFT
ANDREW N. WELLS
WILLIAM TUCKER DEAN, Faculty Advisor
POLLY C.P. WONG, Secretary
The Journal is pleased to announce the election of Officers for Volume 13, 1979-80: WILLIAM W.
SCHROEDER, Editor-in-C6ie PETER I. FRIEDENBERG, JONATHAN H. GEORGE, and MARY BRIGID
MCMANAMON, Managing Editors- JOHN C. PEIRCE, Article & Book Review Editor; SUSAN D. GOLAND,
SANDRA E. LORIMER, and ALICIA PLOTKIN, Note & Comment Editors; DAVID A. FRANKEL and
STEPHEN R. SEELY, Research Editors; ALAN D. SCHEER, Business Editor.

